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State Formation in Palestine: Viability and Governance during a Social
Transformation,edited by Mushtaq Husain Khan, with George Giacaman and
Inge Amundsen. London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004. x + 238 pages. Index to
p. 249. $19.99 paper.
Ever since the first internationally sponsored effort in May 2000 to reha-
bilitate the economic governance record of the Palestinian Authority (PA),
issues of corruption, transparency, and reform have become inextricably in-
tertwined with the political debate of the day. At that time, PA President Yasir
Arafat, with support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), established
the Higher Council for Development (HCD) to oversee PA efforts to enhance
governance and strengthen public finances. The strategic role envisaged for
the HCD, which included three ministers, was to help reorient PA economic
policies and to bring Palestinian public policy more into line with global stan-
dards. The HCD met only a few times and was not transformed into a financial
reform instrument, though the issues with which it was mandated to deal
became the central planks of Ministry of Finance reform over the subsequent
years. These included consolidating disparate public revenue accounts; curtail-
ing current public expenditures; fully disclosing PA commercial operations and
investments; designing a privatization strategy for PA holdings; and elaborating
PA policy on public debt.
Hundred-day, annual, and triennial plans have since been drawn up, interna-
tional conferences and seminars convened, and countless teams of international
experts dispatched to Palestine to address the Palestinian record in this newly
critical area of economic performance. And as the possibility of progress on
the vital Palestinian issues of occupation, refugees, sovereignty, and Jerusalem
grew more distant after 2000, so have the pressures on the PA for some/any
movement forward in the vast area of Palestinian internal “reform” intensified.
Tellingly, a Google Internet search for “Palestinian reform” in mid-March 2005
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revealed 1.4 million Web pages relevant to the subject and 7,000 news items
over a typical ten-day period.
REFORMING THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY
Today, all parties (except perhaps the PA) consider that intractable issues
such as statehood cannot be addressed until the PA has undertaken wide-
ranging reforms. For many years, PA officials under Arafat would bristle at sug-
gestions of corruption in their midst or at best would point to other developing
(and developed) countries and national liberation movements as evidence that
nobody is perfect. They also could credibly argue that problems of ministerial
mismanagement, lack of financial accountability, corruption, and patronage had
first been uncovered and investigated by PA institutions (e.g., PA Comptroller
General report of 1997, Palestinian Legislative Council report of 1998). But
since the short-lived government of Mahmud Abbas in 2002, and even more so
under the post-Arafat regime, PA financial accounts and functions, ministerial
structures, policy roles, draft legislation, and development plans have all been
subject to extraordinary scrutiny by donors and the international community
and their watchdog institutions.
While some PA officials continue to remonstrate that reform remains first
and foremost a Palestinian affair, the PA has signed on to a host of essentially
new governance commitments proposed by donors at the March 2005 London
Meeting on Strengthening the Palestinian Authority. Most of the London com-
mitments had already appeared in previous PA Reform Plan documents. How-
ever, the prioritization, emphasis, and direction of PA “reform” today entail
growing hands-on international funding and support, administered through a
host of donor coordination fora and channels and joint working groups with
PA counterparts.
Prior to the year 2000, the international community was careful not to
rock the PA governance boat too hard so as not to compromise the much-
trumpeted “economic dividends of peace” widely seen as central to the suc-
cess of the Oslo process. Thus, while some international agencies and task
forces have over the years addressed the overall challenges facing the PA
in the area of building governance institutions and the rule of law (e.g.,
the Rocard Commission report of 1999), only a few of these investigations
openly tackled the most widely cited forms of “corruption” (monopolies, un-
declared public revenues, irrational or wasteful public expenditures, graft,
extortion, and patronage) except in the most careful and diplomatic terms.
As has been well documented elsewhere, donors moved slowly in making
their concerns known to the PA, mainly working through back channels and
discrete pressure rather than through objective, transparent, and construc-
tive debate and dialogue. Indeed, until 2000 most donors expressly refrained
from attaching any political or other explicit conditions to their aid to the
PA, despite a good knowledge of the state of PA governance and financial
control.
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Since the end of the peace talks, however, creeping donor micromanage-
ment of PA finances and programs was prompted initially by the need to ac-
count to legislatures and to respond to claims of donor funds being diverted by
the PA to finance Arafat’s security apparatus. These fears were proven largely
unfounded by international inquiries and independent reports, most notably
the investigations by the European Commission and Parliament between 2003
and 2005, as well as a 2003 IMF report, which documented PA off-budget fi-
nances and concluded that donor funds had not been diverted for illegitimate
purposes. Soon, however, with the increasing fragility of the PA and its deficit
finances since 2004, the attention of donors and international institutions be-
gan to turn to the nuts and bolts of PA finances, civil service performance, and
the degree of its commitment to market transparency and liberalism.
Certainly, the use of traditional “conditionality” by donors and interna-
tional lending institutions has not been feasible in the Palestinian case both





a level and intimacy that, in
all but name, amounted to
an international financial
trusteeship.
for political/moral and legal reasons (i.e., the situation
of occupation and the fact that the PA/Palestine is not
a recognized state). By 2005, however, the degree of
international involvement in Palestinian economic and
public sector management had reached a level and in-
timacy that, in all but name, amounted to an interna-
tional financial trusteeship for the envisioned State of
Palestine. Through a variety of trust funds, oversight
and auditing mechanisms, built-in budget controls, and
technical assistance projects, donors and international
institutions are well placed to monitor the operation of
PA public finances down to the last shekel. This total financial transparency
has without doubt encouraged continued donor support for the PA budget in a
climate of uncertainty and is proudly exhibited by the PA and IMF as a model for
developing countries. But it also implies that international aid for Palestine is
less and less “demand-driven” by the Palestinian beneficiary’s national strategies
and increasingly “supply-driven” by donor agendas.
THE PALESTINIAN ECONOMY AND THE QUEST FOR A STATE
The Palestinian economy, as most international observers agree, continues
to feature deep-seated structural imbalances and distortions, both within the
economy itself and in its external sector (trade, labor, and finance). These
persist owing to occupation, separation from neighboring states, internal frag-
mentation, war, institutional attrition, and the uncertainty of implementation
of the two-state solution envisioned in UN Security Council resolution 1397 and
the road map. In the absence of deliberate and comprehensive policy attention
to these pending challenges, the Palestinian economy is effectively being trans-
formed into one of subsistence. While the decline since 2000 stabilized after
2003, this has so far been, at best, a rebound from, and adjustment to, a very
depressed economy that has lost at least one fifth of its economic base over the
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last four years. The PA (and its international supporters) has recently begun
to emphasize that any political process or moves toward alleviating those
constraints and blockages should go parallel with an economic development
strategy. Yet even in the absence of political progress, the Palestinian economy
has demonstrated resilience and successfully employed coping strategies,
which should provide the guiding elements of conflict and postconflict
development endeavors by the PA and the international community.
The crisis of recent years has highlighted the vulnerability of the economy,
which even before the onset of the al-Aqsa intifada lacked an internal engine
of growth and was highly dependent on donor assistance and employment in
Israel for generating growth. Aggregate economic indicators continue to depict
an adverse environment and dim prospects for trade, investment, employment,
or social welfare. The dark cloud’s silver lining, if there is one, is that against all
odds, Palestinian society has come together in unprecedented social cohesive-
ness. For example, it managed in 2003 to employ domestically more workers
than in 1999, including some 77,000 workers of the 130,000 no longer em-
ployed in Israel. Although this shift was involuntary, and at lower wages and
productivity, it shows that in the face of harsh conditions the Palestinian econ-
omy has been able to adjust and to increase employment, thereby redistributing
whatever income it was able to accrue under economic siege.
The publication of State Formation in Palestine could not have come at
a better moment to stimulate a more open and frank debate on an issue that
has become increasingly contentious in PA-donor relations. For the first time, a
scholarly and thoroughly researched analysis has been published on the reali-
ties, facts, and figures of Palestinian economic management since 1994, as well
as its interactions with the external environment and obligations created by the
Oslo accords. The findings of this research project, undertaken by an impres-
sive team of international and Palestinian economists and social scientists and
hosted by the Palestinian NGO Muwatin, are accessible not only to specialists
but also, notwithstanding its rigorous conceptual framework, a wider audience
interested in Palestinian affairs.
Development activists, practitioners, and policy-makers can all benefit from
the volume’s serious economic analysis and methodology, thanks to the skillful
editing of and contributions by Mushtaq Khan, senior lecturer at the School
of Oriental and African Studies and a leading development economist. And
more general readers, including both sympathizers and detractors of the PA,
can learn from the presentations in this volume to be more prudent in offering
sweeping generalizations about the Palestinian leadership’s mixed institutional
and policy performance, commonly lumped together under the broad and
simplistic theme of “corruption.” Through reference to a body of literature
already well established by Khan and other studies of Asian development expe-
riences, this collaborative volume, which is based on intensive field research,
allows for a better understanding of phenomena known in the discipline as the
seeking and generation of nonproductive economic “rents.” A straightforward
non-academic source defines rent seeking as “the inclination of everyone who
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is alive and breathing to get as much as they can for themselves. This stems
from the idea of economic rent, which is a payment over above the opportu-
nity cost. People are said to be rent seeking when they try to get higher wages,
more profit, or any other payment over above the minimum they would be
willing to accept.”∗
As the reader will discover, not only are some of the usually cited forms
of “corruption” widely practiced in developing (not to mention developed)
countries, but these have also, under certain conditions, led to lasting devel-
opment and state-formation gains for many of the countries that engage in
such practices. With reference to the experiences of countries such as South
Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Thailand, and China, Khan shows in this volume (and
elsewhere) that “the evidence of historical transition thus shows that the se-
quence of reforms that led these countries to successful capitalist development
contradicts” the conventional wisdom and orthodoxy in this field (p. 26). And
when this line of inquiry is pursued in the specific Palestinian case, the inter-
relation between national/political and economic policy-making processes is
seen to have a powerful effect on the incidence and impact of rent generation
and rent seeking in Palestine. In the Palestinian situation, it is clear that while
corruption may be a serious ethical problem, its existence and role cannot be
separated from unique state-formation and capitalist accumulation processes
under particularly difficult conditions. For reform to be meaningful and ben-
eficial to the “reformee,” the practices to be reformed should be understood
and dealt with in their wider context. An open-minded reading of this book
can provide a new angle from which to evaluate PA performance so far and
to design the best possible development policies and practices in the coming
phase of Palestinian state formation.
The first chapter of the book sets out the conceptual and historical frame-
work for the research as a whole, while the second chapter looks at potential
outcomes of the state formation process and their viability in light of that frame-
work. The policy and regulatory environment for Israeli-Palestinian economic
relations since Oslo is covered by a third chapter, followed by a review of the
PA political institutional experience and its relevance for state formation in
chapter 4. The last three chapters examine the main components of the PA’s
finances: monopolies, taxation, and donor assistance.
The book sets out with two main objectives, which are pursued consistently
in the careful synthesis of the contributions by its eleven coauthors. Its first,
over-arching purpose is to revisit, indeed redefine, the 1994–2000 PA institu-
tional development experience and the economic management challenges it
∗ As defined by AmosWEB (www.amosweb.com). A more academic definition by Alan
Deardorff (http://www-personal.umich.edu/∼alandear/glossary/) of economic rent is
“the premium that the owner of a resource receives over and above its opportunity cost,”
while rent seeking is defined as “the using up of real resources in an effort to secure the
rights to economic rents that arise from government policies” and by extension, rent
generation is the active provision and management of rents, usually by governments.
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spawned. The authors understand this as a process of state formation under ad-
verse conditions, starting with the “asymmetric relation” with Israel enshrined
in the Oslo accords and compounded by the post-2000 devastation wrought by
four years of war and uncertainty. This asymmetry threatens the nascent state’s
diverse means of survival, beginning with those in the financial sphere. This ap-
proach implies that instead of identifying a series of “corrupt” rent-generation
and rent-seeking processes as generic sources of economic inefficiencies and
distortions in need of reform, these processes must be analyzed in relation to
the overriding imperatives of Palestinian national aspirations, state formation,
and socioeconomic development objectives. The question then arises as to
the policy space available to the Palestinian leadership in pursuing its national
agenda in a hostile environment—i.e., to what extent it can exercise the “in-
dependent Palestinian decision” to which Arafat often referred and which was
actually synonymous with much of his lifelong Palestinian national strategy.
The second, and equally important and innovative, objective of this vol-
ume is to demonstrate, through well-referenced, balanced, and transparent
research, just how sophisticated and pluralistic Palestinian state formation and
economic management processes have been over the past ten years. The crude
but prevalent characterization of the scale and purposes of the legendary “Arafat
financial empire,” which was put into realistic perspective by a February 2005
Financial Times investigative article, appears even less plausible in the light
of the complex and effective PA rent-management system depicted by Khan
and his co-contributors. After reviewing the system and assessing it in an eco-
nomic development light, this book recasts what casual observers see as a
corrupt and unchecked regime of patronage to sustain political domination, as
a thoroughly rational and carefully managed component of a deliberate state
formation process.
In pursuing this second objective, the authors are actually tackling the con-
ventional wisdom established by mainstream neoliberal economists over the
past two decades in the context of the “Washington consensus” on “sound”
economic and development policies, still upheld largely intact by the Bretton
Woods Institutions (the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund). A
deft economist like Khan is on familiar territory in this respect, and the book’s
calm and reasonable analysis, coupled with the appropriate moral rejection of
corruption in general, makes for a strong case that both donor institutions and
Palestinian economic policy makers should address with the same transparency
and realism. It is also a valuable empirical and methodological addition to the
growing literature on rent management worldwide.
GOOD GOVERNANCE AND POSSIBLE STATE FORMATION OUTCOMES
Khan’s lead chapter introduces the reader to prevailing economic theory re-
garding rent management through his review of the “good governance” agenda,
which is rooted in neoclassical economics (contemporary mainstream eco-
nomic thought) and liberal politics and the related “neopatrimonial” model
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from modern political science. Both conceptual frameworks relate democracy,
anticorruption policies, free-market economics, and ensuing prosperity in a
sort of virtuous cycle.
According to “good governance” development policy, a competitive market
economy is efficient to the extent that it precludes or eliminates “imper-
fections” such as the generation of rents, or “politically-generated income,
which would not exist without some specific rights, subsidies, or transfers
that were artificially maintained through a political process” (p. 19). The
existence/generation of economic rents within the discretion of the state,
and the seeking of rents by interest groups willing to expend resources to
capture those rents, are mutually reinforcing. In the neopatrimonial analysis,
the personalization of power is a result of the absence of democratic,
accountable government: “the state is the ‘property’ of the leader who rules
with the help of his clients” (p. 23). Corruption is systemic and the economy
features “politically driven accumulation by the leader and his clients,” which
debilitates the economy.
Khan’s chapter recalls that rents can be generated in the form of monopoly
rights granted over certain import commodities, subsidies, redistributive in-
come transfers, and unnecessary public sector job creation. At the same time,
rents are often sought either legally (such as expenditures on lobbying or contri-
butions to political parties) or illegally (bribes to public officials by individuals
or firms, illegal funding of parties, and other illegal influence-seeking modes).
There is also a grey area of quasi-legal rent seeking, which often entails gaining
privileged access to the state and its resources.
For good governance gurus, the impact of rent seeking can only be negative
and unproductive, and should thus be prevented (or eliminated) through a
package of reforms. In their generic “one-size-fits-all” format, these reforms
include privatization of state commercial or productive holdings, elimination
of state-enforced or protected monopolies, public finance transparency, and
minimal state intervention in market operations, among other prescriptions.
According to the orthodoxy, these are most effective when pursued in parallel
with democratic and accountable government that prevents minority groups
from seeking—and thus encouraging the generation of—rents and upholds
the virtuous cycle.
While Khan maintains that “corruption is illegal rent-seeking,” he also clar-
ifies that “much rent seeking consists of legal activities that aim to influence
public officials for the benefit of rent-seekers” (p. 20). For this volume, it is as
important to investigate the evidence and determinants of rent generation and
rent management in the Palestinian context as it is to place these processes in
the appropriate state-formation conceptual framework. Khan is well aware that
rent seeking and rent generation can lead to the formation of client, predatory,
or fragmented clientelist states and political systems, but he also demonstrates
the no less significant historical experiences leading to other results—notably
the so-called developmental state. These four types of states are distinguished
from each other in terms of the prevalence of rents in their economy as well
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as how each manages rents and toward what ends. Thus, while a client state
usually features a deeply entrenched relationship with an external (state or
non-state) actor, the predatory state has systemized corrupt rent generation
and rent seeking to an extent that debilitates development prospects. As for
the fragmented clientelist state, this type compensates for limited budgetary
resources by allocating resources to critical economic agents within patron-
client networks.
By contrast, in the case of the developmental state, Khan shows how eco-
nomic rents can be generated, managed, and eventually phased out as part
of a strategic state formation process underpinned by a national development
agenda. In this state type, rents are managed to maintain political stability, and
their transfer to capitalists is conditional upon performance. Rent seeking en-
tails mainly lobbying by emerging capitalists to obtain specific types of rents:
income transfers, redistributive rents, or temporary monopoly rents. In the
historical experience cited by Khan, moderate or high economic growth often
ensues in such states. In the least developed state type, the client state, on the
other hand, transfers from external sources are critical for state survival and
are handed down to internal factions through a client state intermediary. Re-
sources are used and managed (often mismanaged) through illegal channels by
public officials to maintain security and political control. Economic outcomes
can range from moderate growth, if an economic integration strategy is pur-
sued with the patron state(s), to vulnerable, uncertain growth in cases where
the patron state relates to its client in the context of a strategy that the authors
term asymmetric containment.
Khan’s introductory chapter as well as the following chapter, which he
wrote with sociologist Jamil Hilal, present the volume’s central findings on the
interrelationship between Palestinian state formation under the PA and rent
management, focusing on the specificities of the Palestinian self-government
arrangements established by the Oslo accords. Their analysis finds “moderate
evidence” in the Palestinian experience of practices prevalent in the predatory
and fragmented clientelist models, in the form of some extortion and econom-
ically damaging monopolies, and factional resource allocation, respectively.
A central tenet of the book’s analysis is that the Oslo economic accords,
and in particular the manner in which they were implemented within the
prevailing balance of economic and political/security power between the two
sides, were viewed (and used) by Israel as the instrument of an overriding eco-
nomic containment policy. In fact, the book evaluates the economic record of
the 1994–2000 interim period as having been primarily determined by Israel’s
political/security needs which entailed a gradual disengagement from the eco-
nomic integration strategy underpinning the Oslo regime. Though this research
precedes the Israeli Gaza disengagement plan of 2004, events since then have
only confirmed that the New Middle East touted by Shimon Peres at the height
of the peace process in the 1990s is a long-forgotten vision (mirage?) of coop-
eration that has been reduced today to barriers, checkpoints, no-go zones, and
closures. While major economic links remain, especially in trade and finance,
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few common interests are perceived by either of the sides and cooperation in
labor, investment, and other Oslo-period joint ventures is almost nonexistent.
The containment policy is thoroughly discussed in this context in the third
chapter by economists Adel Zagha and Husam Zumlot. The authors explain
the policy in detail through reference to the terms of the Paris Protocol on
Economic Relations that govern their trade and financial relations until today,
and its implementation by Israel (and the PA). This policy, along with “extensive
evidence” of client state rents (undeclared resources spent on security control,
management of rent allocation for political stabilization purposes) leads Khan
to consider this state type especially relevant to the Palestinian experience. And
the Palestinian evidence of rent-management practices that may be considered
as predatory indicates that the state formation process has yet to stabilize in
one clear direction. But he and the other authors generally see these rents
as inevitable outcomes of the asymmetric balance of political and sovereign
powers between Israel and Palestine. This asymmetry should be addressed if
corrupt rent management is to be usefully and effectively tackled.
DEVELOPMENTAL RENT GENERATION AND PALESTINIAN
STATE FORMATION
One of the significant findings drawn throughout this volume is the extent to
which some of the PA rent-generation processes were developmental in intent
and practice, notwithstanding limited state capacity in regulating those rents.
The authors are very careful not to mistake predatory or other types of rents for
what might be construed as developmental rents. “Nevertheless, although this
is not widely recognized, there were elements in the rent allocation organized
by the PA that were consistent with a nascent developmental state” (p. 55). The
most notable of these developmental rents was their use to attract Palestinian
expatriate capitalists with funds and experience (Arafat, again, often referred to
his search for “Palestine’s Rothschild”) and to correct allocations of rents to the
most economically efficient entrepreneurs. Perhaps the most notable examples
of these are some of the private import monopolies granted by the PA and public
sector involvement in commercial activities, though the book is careful not to
overstate the efficiency of their application in the PA experience so far.
The fascinating fifth chapter by distinguished Birzeit University Professor
Mohamed Nasr on PA monopolies provides a short explanation of the eco-
nomic costs of what are generally considered to be inefficiencies in resource
allocation that result from monopolistic practices. The chapter is certainly
the most careful and thoroughly referenced study of this subject to appear
anywhere and makes clear the different roles and functions of private and
public monopolies, both of which had some damaging economic effects that
Nasr does not minimize. However, Nasr’s lasting contribution is in showing
how “some monopolies might have played a positive role in promoting pri-
vate sector investments . . . especially in infrastructure and services,” as well as
the critical off-budget financing provided by certain public import monopolies
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that “were rational responses on the part of the PA in a context where its
trade and fiscal opportunities were serious constrained by the Paris Protocol”
(p. 188).
The other chapters in the book are no less revealing. Chapter 4, by political
scientists Inge Amundsen and Basem Zbedi, provides a relevant institutional
vantage point from which to round out the Palestinian state-formation story,
with clear evidence that the PA demonstrated “relatively positive prospects for
becoming a developmental entity” and “strong political will to embark on a
developmental economic course, which was its only option” (pp. 162–63). In
this article, as in others, the authors are careful with their new findings and do
not ignore other indications that the PA had traits congruent with the clientelist
state model (presidentialist and patrimonial logics). But the emphasis here and
throughout the book on the positive aspects of the PA institutional record (the
cup seen as half full) deserve no less attention than the countless references
elsewhere that stress the Palestinian governance cup as being, at best, half
empty.
Another chapter by economists Odd Fjeldstad and Adel Zagha competently
addresses the complex and critical Palestinian tax and fiscal administration,
which was one of the main channels for maintaining and manipulating the
client-state relation between the PA and Israel (through import and other tax
clearance arrangements and mechanisms as well as donor funding channels).
The chapter also highlights the PA’s functional and institutional achievements in
managing this sector, at least until 2000: “the PA was able to maintain macroeco-
nomic orthodoxy while providing generous tax incentives for important groups
in society as well as fairly progressive social policies paid for with the revenue
windfall from foreign aid and the monopolies” (p. 209). And the concluding
chapter on donor assistance, rent seeking, and elite formation by sociologist
Sari Hanafi, with Linda Tabar, is daring in exploring the intricate balance of
interests and resource transfers between donors, the PA, and civil society. The
short, but groundbreaking, section on the role of Palestinian “monopolistic
mega-NGOs,” rent seeking in the NGO sector, and the “emergence of NGO
leaders as a new globalized elite” (pp. 233–36) rounds out the volume’s con-
tribution to a much deeper and more objective understanding of the overall
Palestinian development experience since 1994.
This exhaustive volume is not, however, solely concerned with setting the
historical record straight, which it does admirably. It is also intended to pave
the way for establishing benchmarks for developmental rent generation that
could contribute to state viability in the future. This is a task of vital importance
to Palestinian policy makers, both in terms of preparing for the next phase of
state formation and in being better equipped to address conditionality ques-
tions that will almost certainly arise as they enter into more intensive negoti-
ations with donors and the Bretton Woods Institutions. Already, aid is being
gently and loosely tied to progress in “performance indicators” in political, ad-
ministrative, legal, and security reform, as the London meeting demonstrated.
It would appear to be only a matter of time before that is extended to include
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macroeconomic, fiscal, and trade policy. This book should set off alarm bells,
and it can only be hoped that the PA is listening.
In Khan’s meticulous logic, rent-management reform is not enough to assure
the viability of the future state, and indeed on its own could undermine that
viability, as the concluding paragraph of his introductory chapter states clearly:
If capitalist development and the deepening of political insti-
tutions take place in parallel, the emerging capitalist system
can become politically entrenched through democracy. . . .
But since the Palestinian economy during our period could
hardly be described as having achieved the necessary con-
ditions for viable economic development in the long term,
focusing on the secondary reforms necessary for politically
entrenching a dynamic capitalist economy would not neces-
sarily ensure viability in this context. These reform priorities
can be especially misleading if they take attention away from
the fundamental constraints that prevented the construction
of a viable Palestinian state. Indeed . . . some of the apparent
governance failures of the PA were in fact rent-management
strategies that attempted to enhance the economic and po-
litical viability of the state in the context of containment. If
reform removed these capacities without addressing the prob-
lems they were responding to, the emergence of a viable state
may become less likely. (pp. 59–60)
This book is by no means the last word in a debate that has increasingly im-
portant implications for future Palestinian state viability. Nor should it be taken
as a sophisticated fig leaf for crooked or dubious rent-management practices
by the PA today or in the future. Nevertheless, amidst the plethora of inter-
national studies and reports and continuing strong media interest in the open
book of Palestinian public finances, this new alternative approach merits the
serious attention of researchers, policy-makers, and international institutions
and greater exposition to Palestinian public opinion.
